Eclipse Mining Consortium - Bitcoin Wiki

Default English word list

Alright so, I took the default database from there https://skribbliohints.github.io/ and with the help of html, I extracted the words to a list separated by commas. It's useful when you want to translate those words into your native language.
Word of advice, when using google translate, do not put all words at once there, it can rapidly worsen the translation.
(And there is a last thing. Their algorithm of picking only custom words is not working really good, at least for me. Meaning that I often get duplicates, despite having a list this big and without duplicates. I'm still trying to find some solution to this, so if somebody is experiencing this as well, share the knowledge please, I will do the same.)
SOLUTION: Thanks for the reply from PepegaWR who identified the cause. I also tested it and there seems to be a custom words limit of 5000 characters. The easiest way in my opinion is to shuffle the words before each session to minimize the impact. Also thanks to the flynger who had the same idea before me :)
Finally, here it is, enjoy the scribbling ^^ :

ABBA, AC/DC, Abraham Lincoln, Adidas, Africa, Aladdin, America, Amsterdam, Android, Angelina Jolie, Angry Birds, Antarctica, Anubis, Apple, Argentina, Asia, Asterix, Atlantis, Audi, Australia, BMW, BMX, Bambi, Band-Aid, Barack Obama, Bart Simpson, Batman, Beethoven, Bible, Big Ben, Bill Gates, Bitcoin, Black Friday, Bomberman, Brazil, Bruce Lee, Bugs Bunny, Canada, Capricorn, Captain America, Cat Woman, Cerberus, Charlie Chaplin, Chewbacca, China, Chinatown, Christmas, Chrome, Chuck Norris, Colosseum, Cookie Monster, Crash Bandicoot, Creeper, Croatia, Cuba, Cupid, DNA, Daffy Duck, Darwin, Darwin Watterson, Deadpool, Dexter, Discord, Donald Duck, Donald Trump, Dora, Doritos, Dracula, Dumbo, Earth, Easter, Easter Bunny, Egypt, Eiffel tower, Einstein, Elmo, Elon Musk, Elsa, Eminem, England, Europe, Excalibur, Facebook, Family Guy, Fanta, Ferrari, Finn, Finn and Jake, Flash, Florida, France, Frankenstein, Fred Flintstone, Gandalf, Gandhi, Garfield, Germany, God, Goofy, Google, Great Wall, Greece, Green Lantern, Grinch, Gru, Gumball, Happy Meal, Harry Potter, Hawaii, Hello Kitty, Hercules, Hollywood, Home Alone, Homer Simpson, Hula Hoop, Hulk, Ikea, India, Intel, Ireland, Iron Giant, Iron Man, Israel, Italy, Jack-o-lantern, Jackie Chan, James Bond, Japan, JayZ, Jenga, Jesus Christ, Jimmy Neutron, John Cena, Johnny Bravo, KFC, Katy Perry, Kermit, Kim Jong-un, King Kong, Kirby, Kung Fu, Lady Gaga, Las Vegas, Lasagna, Lego, Leonardo DiCaprio, Leonardo da Vinci, Lion King, London, London Eye, Luigi, MTV, Madagascar, Mario, Mark Zuckerberg, Mars, McDonalds, Medusa, Mercedes, Mercury, Mexico, Michael Jackson, Mickey Mouse, Microsoft, Milky Way, Minecraft, Miniclip, Minion, Minotaur, Mona Lisa, Monday, Monster, Mont Blanc, Morgan Freeman, Morse code, Morty, Mount Everest, Mount Rushmore, Mozart, Mr. Bean, Mr. Meeseeks, Mr Bean, Mr Meeseeks, Mummy, NASCAR, Nasa, Nemo, Neptune, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nike, Nintendo Switch, North Korea, Northern Lights, Norway, Notch, Nutella, Obelix, Olaf, Oreo, Pac-Man, Paris, Patrick, Paypal, Peppa Pig, Pepsi, Phineas and Ferb, Photoshop, Picasso, Pikachu, Pink Panther, Pinocchio, Playstation, Pluto, Pokemon, Popeye, Popsicle, Porky Pig, Portugal, Poseidon, Pringles, Pumba, Reddit, Rick, Robbie Rotten, Robin Hood, Romania, Rome, Russia, Samsung, Santa, Saturn, Scooby Doo, Scotland, Segway, Sherlock Holmes, Shrek, Singapore, Skittles, Skrillex, Skype, Slinky, Solar System, Sonic, Spain, Spartacus, Spiderman, SpongeBob, Squidward, Star Wars, Statue of Liberty, Steam, Stegosaurus, Steve Jobs, Stone Age, Sudoku, Suez Canal, Superman, Susan Wojcicki, Sydney Opera House, T-rex, Tails, Tarzan, Teletubby, Terminator, Tetris, The Beatles, Thor, Titanic, Tooth Fairy, Tower Bridge, Tower of Pisa, Tweety, Twitter, UFO, USB, Uranus, Usain Bolt, Vatican, Vault boy, Velociraptor, Venus, Vin Diesel, W-LAN, Wall-e, WhatsApp, William Shakespeare, William Wallace, Winnie the Pooh, Wolverine, Wonder Woman, Xbox, Xerox, Yin and Yang, Yoda, Yoshi, Youtube, Zelda, Zeus, Zorro, Zuma, abstract, abyss, accident, accordion, ace, acid, acne, acorn, action, actor, addiction, addition, adorable, adult, advertisement, afro, afterlife, air conditioner, airbag, aircraft, airplane, airport, alarm, albatross, alcohol, alien, allergy, alley, alligator, almond, alpaca, ambulance, anaconda, anchor, angel, anglerfish, angry, animation, anime, ant, anteater, antelope, antenna, anthill, antivirus, anvil, apartment, apocalypse, applause, apple, apple pie, apple seed, apricot, aquarium, arch, archaeologist, archer, architect, aristocrat, arm, armadillo, armor, armpit, arrow, ash, assassin, assault, asteroid, astronaut, asymmetry, athlete, atom, attic, audience, autograph, avocado, axe, baboon, baby, back pain, backbone, backflip, backpack, bacon, bad, badger, bag, bagel, bagpipes, baguette, bait, bakery, baklava, balance, balcony, bald, ball, ballerina, ballet, balloon, bamboo, banana, bandage, bandana, banjo, bank, banker, bar, barbarian, barbecue, barbed wire, barber, barcode, bark, barn, barrel, bartender, base, basement, basket, basketball, bat, bathroom, bathtub, battery, battle, battleship, bayonet, bazooka, beach, beak, bean, bean bag, beanie, beanstalk, bear, bear trap, beatbox, beaver, bed, bed bug, bed sheet, bedtime, bee, beef, beer, beet, beetle, bell, bell pepper, bellow, belly, belly button, below, belt, bench, betray, bicycle, bill, billiards, bingo, binoculars, biology, birch, bird, bird bath, birthday, biscuit, bite, black, black hole, blackberry, blacksmith, blanket, bleach, blender, blimp, blind, blindfold, blizzard, blood, blowfish, blue, blueberry, blush, boar, board, boat, bobsled, bodyguard, boil, bomb, booger, book, bookmark, bookshelf, boomerang, boots, border, bottle, bottle flip, bounce, bouncer, bow, bowl, bowling, box, boy, bracelet, braces, brain, brainwash, branch, brand, bread, breakfast, breath, brick, bricklayer, bride, bridge, broadcast, broccoli, broken heart, bronze, broom, broomstick, brownie, bruise, brunette, brush, bubble, bubble gum, bucket, building, bulge, bull, bulldozer, bullet, bumper, bungee jumping, bunk bed, bunny, burglar, burp, burrito, bus, bus driver, bus stop, butcher, butler, butt cheeks, butter, butterfly, button, cab driver, cabin, cabinet, cactus, cage, cake, calendar, camel, camera, campfire, camping, can, can opener, canary, candle, canister, cannon, canyon, cap, cape, cappuccino, captain, car wash, cardboard, carnival, carnivore, carpenter, carpet, carrot, cartoon, cash, casino, cast, cat, catalog, catapult, caterpillar, catfish, cathedral, cauldron, cauliflower, cave, caveman, caviar, ceiling, ceiling fan, celebrate, celebrity, cell, cell phone, cello, cement, centaur, centipede, chain, chainsaw, chair, chalk, chameleon, champagne, champion, chandelier, charger, cheek, cheeks, cheerleader, cheese, cheeseburger, cheesecake, cheetah, chef, chemical, cherry, cherry blossom, chess, chest, chest hair, chestnut, chestplate, chew, chicken, chihuahua, child, chime, chimney, chimpanzee, chin, chinchilla, chocolate, chopsticks, church, cicada cigarette, cinema, circle, circus, clap, clarinet, classroom, claw, clay, clean, clickbait, cliff, climb, cloak, clock, cloth, clothes hanger, cloud, clover, clown, clownfish, coach, coal, coast, coast guard, coaster, coat, cobra, cockroach, cocktail, coconut, cocoon, coffee, coffee shop, coffin, coin, cola, cold, collapse, collar, color-blind, comb, comedian, comedy, comet, comfortable, comic book, commander, commercial, communism, community, compass, complete, computer, concert, condiment, cone, confused, console, continent, controller, conversation, cookie, cookie jar, copper, copy, coral, coral reef, cord, cork, corkscrew, corn, corn dog, corner, cornfield, corpse, cotton, cotton candy, country, cousin, cow, cowbell, cowboy, coyote, crab, crack, crate, crawl space, crayon, cream, credit, credit card, cricket, cringe, crocodile, croissant, crossbow, crow, crowbar, crucible, cruise, crust, crystal, cube, cuckoo, cucumber, cup, cupboard, cupcake, curry, curtain, cushion, customer, cut, cute, cyborg, cylinder, cymbal, dagger, daisy, dalmatian, dance, dandelion, dandruff, darts, dashboard, daughter, day, dead, deaf, deep, deer, defense, delivery, demon, demonstration, dent, dentist, deodorant, depressed, derp, desert, desk, desperate, dessert, detective, detonate, dew, diagonal, diagram, diamond, diaper, dice, dictionary, die, diet, dig, dinner, dinosaur, diploma, dirty, disaster, disease, dishrag, dispenser, display, diss track, distance, diva, divorce, dizzy, dock, doctor, dog, doghouse, doll, dollar, dollhouse, dolphin, dome, dominoes, donkey, door, doorknob, dots, double, dough, download, dragon, dragonfly, drain, drama, drawer, dream, dress, drink, drip, drive, driver, drool, droplet, drought, drum, drum kit, duck, duct tape, duel, dwarf, dynamite, eagle, ear, earbuds, earthquake, earwax, east, eat, echo, eclipse, eel, egg, eggplant, elbow, elder, election, electric car, electric guitar, electrician, electricity, elephant, elevator, embers, emerald, emoji, employer, emu, end, engine, engineer, equator, eraser, error, eskimo, espresso, evaporate, evening, evolution, exam, excavator, exercise, explosion, eye, eyebrow, eyelash, eye shadow, fabric, fabulous, facade, face, face paint, factory, failure, fairy, fake teeth, fall, family, farm, farmer, fashion designer, fast, fast food, fast forward, father, faucet, feather, fence, fencing, fern, festival, fidget spinner, field, figurine, filmmaker, filter, finger, fingernail, fingertip, fire alarm, fire hydrant, fire truck, fireball, firecracker, firefighter, firefly, firehouse, fireman, fireplace, fireproof, fireside, firework, fish, fish bowl, fisherman, fist fight, fitness trainer, fizz, flag, flagpole, flamethrower, flamingo, flashlight, flask, flea, flight attendant, flock, floodlight, floppy disk, florist, flower, flu, fluid, flush, flute, fly, fly swatter, flying pig, fog, foil, folder, food, forehead, forest, forest fire, fork, fort, fortress, fortune, fossil, fountain, fox, frame, freckles, freezer, fridge, fries, frog, frostbite, frosting, frown, fruit, full, full moon, funeral, funny, fur, furniture, galaxy, gang, gangster, garage, garbage, garden, gardener, garlic, gas, gas mask, gasoline, gasp, gate, gem, gender, generator, genie, gentle, gentleman, geography, germ, geyser, ghost, giant, gift, giraffe, girl, gladiator, glass, glasses, glitter, globe, gloss, glove, glow, glowstick, glue, glue stick, gnome, goal, goat, goatee, goblin, godfather, gold, gold chain, golden apple, golden egg, goldfish, golf, golf cart, good, goose, gorilla, graduation, graffiti, grandmother, grapefruit, grapes, graph, grass, grasshopper, grave, gravedigger, gravel, graveyard, gravity, greed, grenade, grid, grill, grin, groom, grumpy, guillotine, guinea pig, guitar, gumball, gummy, gummy bear, gummy worm, hacker, hair, hair roller, hairbrush, haircut, hairspray, hairy, half, halo, ham, hamburger, hammer, hammock, hamster, hand, handicap, handle, handshake, hanger, happy, harbor, hard, hard hat, harmonica, harp, harpoon, hashtag, hat, hazard, hazelnut, head, headache, headband, headboard, heading, headphones, health, heart, heat, hedgehog, heel, heist, helicopter, hell, helmet, hen, hermit, hero, hexagon, hibernate, hieroglyph, high five, high heels, high score, highway, hilarious, hill, hip hop, hippie, hippo, hitchhiker, hive, hobbit, hockey, holiday, homeless, honey, honeycomb, hoof, hook, hop, hopscotch, horizon, horn, horse, horsewhip, hose, hospital, hot, hot chocolate, hot dog, hot sauce, hotel, hourglass, house, hovercraft, hug, hummingbird, hunger, hunter, hurdle, hurt, husband, hut, hyena, hypnotize, iPad, iPhone, ice, ice cream, ice cream truck, iceberg, icicle, idea, imagination, impact, incognito, industry, infinite, injection, insect, inside, insomnia, internet, intersection, interview, invasion, invention, invisible, iron, island, ivy, jacket, jackhammer, jaguar, jail, jalapeno, janitor, jaw, jazz, jeans, jeep, jello, jelly, jellyfish, jester, jet ski, joker, journalist, journey, judge, juggle, juice, jump rope, jungle, junk food, kangaroo, karaoke, karate, katana, kazoo, kebab, keg, kendama, ketchup, kettle, key, keyboard, kidney, kindergarten, king, kiss, kitchen, kite, kitten, kiwi, knee, kneel, knife, knight, knot, knuckle, koala, kraken, label, laboratory, ladder, lady, ladybug, lake, lamb, lamp, landlord, landscape, lane, language, lantern, lap, laptop, laser, lasso, laundry, lava, lava lamp, lawn mower, lawyer, leader, leaf, leak, leash, leather, leave, leech, legs, lemon, lemonade, lemur, lens, leprechaun, lettuce, levitate, librarian, library, licorice, lid, light bulb, lighter, lighthouse, lightning, lightsaber, lily, lilypad, limbo, lime, limousine, line, link, lion, lips, lipstick, litter box, lizard, llama, loading, loaf, lobster, lock, log, logo, lollipop, loot, loser, lotion, lottery, lounge, love, low, luck, luggage, lumberjack, lung, lynx, lyrics, macaroni, machine, macho, mafia, magazine, magic, magic trick, magic wand, magician, magma, magnet, magnifier, maid, mailbox, mailman, makeup, mall, mammoth, manatee, manhole, manicure, mannequin, mansion, mantis, map, maracas, marathon, marble, margarine, marigold, market, marmalade, marmot, marshmallow, mascot, mask, massage, match, matchbox, mattress, mayonnaise, mayor, maze, meal, meat, meatball, meatloaf, mechanic, meerkat, megaphone, melon, melt, meme, mermaid, message, messy, metal, meteorite, microphone, microscope, microwave, midnight, military, milk, milkman, milkshake, mime, miner, minigolf, minivan, mint, minute, mirror, missile, model, mohawk, mold, mole, money, monk, monkey, monster, moon, moose, mop, morning, mosquito, moss, moth, mothball, mother, motherboard, motorbike, motorcycle, mountain, mouse, mousetrap, mouth, movie, mud, muffin, mug, murderer, muscle, museum, mushroom, musket, mustache, mustard, nachos, nail, nail file, nail polish, napkin, narwhal, nature, navy, neck, needle, neighbor, neighborhood, nerd, nest, network, newspaper, nickel, night, nightclub, nightmare, ninja, noob, noodle, north, nose, nose hair, nose ring, nosebleed, nostrils, notebook, notepad, nothing, notification, novel, nugget, nuke, nun, nurse, nut, nutcracker, nutmeg, nutshell, oar, observatory, ocean, octagon, octopus, office, oil, old, omelet, onion, open, opera, orange, orangutan, orbit, orca, orchestra, orchid, organ, origami, ostrich, otter, outside, oval, overweight, owl, oxygen, oyster, paddle, page, pain, paint, paintball, pajamas, palace, palette, palm, palm tree, pan, pancake, panda, panpipes, panther, pants, papaya, paper, paper bag, parachute, parade, parakeet, parents, park, parking, parrot, party, password, pasta, pastry, path, patient, patio, patriot, pause, pavement, paw, peace, peach, peacock, peanut, pear, peas, peasant, pedal, pelican, pencil, pencil case, pencil sharpener, pendulum, penguin, peninsula, penny, pensioner, pepper, pepperoni, perfume, periscope, person, pet food, pet shop, petal, pharmacist, photo frame, photograph, photographer, piano, pickaxe, pickle, picnic, pie, pig, pigeon, piggy bank, pigsty, pike, pill, pillar, pillow, pillow fight, pilot, pimple, pin, pinball, pine, pine cone, pineapple, pink, pinky, pinwheel, pipe, pirate, pirate ship, pistachio, pistol, pitchfork, pizza, plague, planet, plank, plate, platypus, player, playground, plow, plug, plumber, plunger, pocket, pogo stick, point, poison, poisonous, poke, polar bear, policeman, pollution, polo, pond, pony, ponytail, poodle, poop, poor, popcorn, pope, poppy, popular, porch, porcupine, portal, portrait, positive, postcard, poster, pot, pot of gold, potato, potion, pound, powder, prawn, pray, preach, pregnant, present, president, pretzel, price tag, priest, prince, princess, printer, prism, prison, pro, procrastination, professor, programmer, promotion, protest, provoke, prune, pub, pudding, puddle, puffin, puma, pumpkin, punishment, punk, puppet, purity, purse, puzzle, pyramid, quarter, queen, queue, quicksand, quill, quilt, quokka, raccoon, race, racecar, radar, radiation, radio, radish, raft, rail, rain, rainbow, raincoat, raindrop, rainforest, raisin, rake, ram, ramp, rapper, raspberry, rat, ravioli, razor, razorblade, read, reality, reception, receptionist, record, rectangle, recycling, red, red carpet, reeds, referee, reflection, reindeer, relationship, religion, remote, repeat, reptile, rest, restaurant, retail, revolver, rewind, rhinoceros, rib, ribbon, rice, ring, ringtone, risk, river, roadblock, robber, robin, robot, rock, rocket, rockstar, roll, roof, room, rooster, root, rose, royal, rubber, ruby, rug, ruler, run, rune, sad, saddle, safari, safe, sailboat, salad, sale, saliva, salmon, salt, saltwater, sand, sand castle, sandbox, sandstorm, sandwich, satellite, sauce, sauna, sausage, saxophone, scar, scarecrow, scarf, scary, scent, school, science, scientist, scissors, scoop, score, scream, screen, screw, scribble, scuba, sculpture, scythe, sea, sea lion, seafood, seagull, seahorse, seal, search, seashell, seasick, season, seat belt, seaweed, second, security, seed, seesaw, semicircle, sensei, server, sew, sewing machine, shadow, shake, shallow, shampoo, shape, shark, shaving cream, sheep, shelf, shell, shipwreck, shirt, shock, shoe, shoebox, shoelace, shop, shopping, shopping cart, short, shotgun, shoulder, shout, shovel, shower, shrew, shrub, shy, sick, signature, silence, silo, silver, silverware, sing, sink, sit, six pack, skateboard, skateboarder, skates, skeleton, ski, ski jump, skin, skinny, skribbl.io, skull, skunk, sky, skydiving, skyline, skyscraper, slam, sledge, sledgehammer, sleep, sleeve, slide, slime, slingshot, slippery, slope, sloth, slow, slump, smell, smile, smoke, snail, snake, sneeze, sniper, snow, snowball, snowball fight, snowboard, snowflake, snowman, soap, soccer, social media, socket, socks, soda, soil, soldier, sombrero, son, sound, soup, south, space, space suit, spaceship, spade, spaghetti, spark, sparkles, spatula, speaker, spear, spelunker, sphinx, spider, spin, spinach, spine, spiral, spit, spoiler, sponge, spool, spoon, spore, sports, spray paint, spring, sprinkler, spy, square, squid, squirrel, stab, stadium, stage, stamp, stand, stapler, star, starfish, starfruit, statue, steam, step, stereo, sting, stingray, stomach, stone, stoned, stop sign, stork, storm, stove, straw, strawberry, streamer, street, stress, strong, student, studio, study, stylus, submarine, subway, sugar, suitcase, summer, sun, sunburn, sunflower, sunglasses, sunrise, sunshade, supermarket, superpower, surface, surfboard, surgeon, survivor, sushi, swag, swamp, swan, swarm, sweat, sweater, swimming pool, swimsuit, swing, switch, sword, swordfish, symphony, table, table tennis, tablecloth, tablet, tabletop, taco, tadpole, tail, tailor, take off, talent show, tampon, tangerine, tank, tape, tarantula, target, taser, tattoo, taxi, taxi driver, tea, teacher, teapot, tear, teaspoon, teddy bear, telephone, telescope, television, temperature, tennis, tennis racket, tent, tentacle, text, thermometer, thief, thin, think, thirst, throat, throne, thug, thumb, thunder, thunderstorm, ticket, tickle, tie, tiger, time machine, timpani, tiny, tip, tiramisu, tire, tired, tissue, tissue box, toad, toast, toaster, toe, toenail, toilet, tomato, tomb, tombstone, tongue, toolbox, tooth, toothbrush, toothpaste, toothpick, top hat, torch, tornado, torpedo, tortoise, totem, toucan, touch, tourist, tow truck, towel, tower, toy, tractor, traffic, traffic light, trailer, train, translate, trap, trapdoor, trash can, traveler, treadmill, treasure, tree, treehouse, trend, triangle, trick shot, tricycle, trigger, triplets, tripod, trombone, trophy, tropical, truck, truck driver, trumpet, tuba, tug, tumor, tuna, tunnel, turd, turkey, turnip, turtle, tuxedo, twig, type, udder, ukulele, umbrella, uncle, underground, underweight, undo, unibrow, unicorn, unicycle, uniform, universe, upgrade, vacation, vaccine, vacuum, valley, vampire, vanilla, vanish, vault, vegetable, vegetarian, vein, vent, vertical, veterinarian, victim, victory, video, video game, village, villain, vine, vinegar, viola, violence, violin, virtual reality, virus, vise, vision, vitamin, vlogger, vodka, volcano, volleyball, volume, vomit, voodoo, vortex, vote, vulture, vuvuzela, waffle, waist, waiter, wake up, walk, wall, wallpaper, walnut, walrus, warehouse, warm, wart, wasp, watch, water, water cycle, water gun, waterfall, wave, wax, weak, wealth, weapon, weasel, weather, web, website, wedding, welder, well, werewolf, west, western, whale, wheel, wheelbarrow, whisk, whisper, whistle, white, wife, wig, wiggle, willow, wind, windmill, window, windshield, wine, wine glass, wing, wingnut, winner, winter, wire, wireless, witch, witness, wizard, wolf, wonderland, woodpecker, wool, work, workplace, world, worm, wound, wrapping, wreath, wrench, wrestler, wrestling, wrinkle, wrist, writer, x-ray, xylophone, yacht, yardstick, yawn, yearbook, yellow, yeti, yo-yo, yogurt, yolk, young, youtuber, zebra, zeppelin, zigzag, zipline, zipper, zombie, zoo, zoom,
submitted by StaroSVK to skribbl [link] [comments]

An analysis on Penguin Magic user reviews

Hello,
To practise some programming, I made an analysis of the user reviews left on penguin magic. I thought you could be interested in some of the results. It made me check a lot of products that I did not know about.
I excluded the reviews for expos and gift cards to analyse only physical items and tricks. I investigated only the items with at least one review. I combined items as Penguin did. This left me with 87761 reviews for 11318 items.
50 Most Reviewed Items
Item Rating Review Count
Born to Perform Card Magic by Oz Pearlman 4.87 556
Invisible Deck 4.70 506
Self Tying Shoelace by Jay Noblezada 4.74 373
Melt 2.0 by Matthew Johnson 4.65 348
Marked Cards 4.67 344
The Stealth Pen presented by Rick Lax 4.73 327
Coffee Break by Gregory Wilson David Gripenwaldt 4.65 320
Torched and Restored by Brent Braun 4.83 252
All Seeing Eye by Dan Harlan 4.75 244
The Poker Test 2.0 by Erik Casey 4.44 236
Binary Code by Rick Lax 4.78 236
The End by Rick Lax 4.64 225
Starcle by Dan Harlan 4.85 220
OneTrix by Mario Lopez 4.50 214
Close-Up Illusion by Larry Jennings presented by Michael Ammar 4.70 206
Hummes Whirling Card 4.36 195
Two Dollar Window by Jay Noblezada 4.80 191
GREED Starring Daniel Garcia 4.54 190
Modern Transportation by David Regal 4.88 187
Vuja De by Rick Lax 4.78 181
DRESSCODE by Calen Morelli 4.75 181
Predixion by Max Maven 4.89 178
Color Monte 4.87 173
The Secrets of Magic by Rick Lax 4.67 173
In the Beginning There Were Coins Starring Jay Noblezada 4.76 170
Panic by Aaron Fisher 4.77 168
Or Not by Dani DaOrtiz 4.74 165
Bicycle Elite Edition Playing Cards 4.72 165
Super Soft Deluxe Nest of Wallets 2.0 by Nick Einhorn and Alan Wong 4.66 162
Tornado by Justin Flom and Rick Lax 4.82 161
BWave DELUXE by Max Maven 4.84 160
Bently by Chris Hanowell 3.60 159
Binary Code 2 by Rick Lax 4.88 159
Copycat by David Parr 4.88 157
BITCOIN by Rick Lax 4.57 157
Muldoon Match by Paul Gordon 4.77 156
ID7 by Rick Lax 4.37 155
Monkey in the Middle by Bill Goldman presented by Magick Balay 4.76 154
Little Door by Roddy McGhie 4.61 153
SPONGE Starring Jay Noblezada 4.80 152
Eclipse by Dave Loosley 4.60 152
Peter Turner LIVE 4.52 152
Position Impossible by Brent Braun 4.83 150
Clutch by Oz Pearlman 4.67 144
Zoltar by Shaun Dunn presented by Lewis Le Val 4.38 144
BANDIT by Darryl Davis & Daryl Williams (a.k.a. The Other Brothers) 4.80 144
The Known by Thom Peterson 4.47 143
The Ultimate Three Domino Monte 4.14 143
Psypher PRO by Robert Smith 4.73 142
Mnemonica Trainer by Rick Lax 4.81 141
25 5 Star (5*) Items
There are a lot of (3245 to be precise) items that received only perfect 5* reviews. But of course, that could be only one reviewer giving 5* and that would not mean a lot. The following table shows most reviewed yet still rated 5* items.
Item Rating Review Count
Diamond Jim Tyler LIVE 5.00 73
Carisa Hendrix LIVE ACTS 5.00 52
David Corsaro LIVE 5.00 30
Halloween by Natalia Silva 5.00 29
Howard Hamburg LIVE 5.00 25
Daniel Chard LIVE ACT 5.00 22
Sibyl by Phedon Bilek 5.00 21
Ian Rowland LIVE ACT 5.00 16
John (Fast Jack) Farrell LIVE 5.00 16
Morgan and West LIVE 5.00 16
Red Pill by Chris Ramsay 5.00 16
Jay Noblezada presents HTG LIVE: Hypnosis Training Group 5.00 16
NX11 :: The Noblezada Experience 5.00 16
QA Masterclass by Bob Cassidy 5.00 16
Takamiz Usui LIVE 5.00 15
Venom Cube by Henry Harrius 5.00 15
Move Zero (Vol 1) by John Bannon and Big Blind Media 5.00 15
Tom Wright LIVE 5.00 15
TC Tahoe LIVE 5.00 15
Jonathan Pendragon LIVE 5.00 15
Jan Forster LIVE ACT 5.00 14
13 Steps To Mentalism (6 DVDs) by Richard Osterlind 5.00 14
Jermays Mind (DVD Set) by Luke Jermay 5.00 14
Phoenix Deck 5.00 14
Tarbell 77: X-Ray Eyes and Blindfold Effects 5.00 14
50 Top Rated Items
I'll list the top-rated items. I'll include only the items that have at least 20 reviews. (This leaves us with 995 items to order).
Item Rating Review Count
Diamond Jim Tyler LIVE 5.00 73
Carisa Hendrix LIVE ACTS 5.00 52
David Corsaro LIVE 5.00 30
Halloween by Natalia Silva 5.00 29
Howard Hamburg LIVE 5.00 25
Daniel Chard LIVE ACT 5.00 22
Sibyl by Phedon Bilek 5.00 21
Diamond Jim Tyler LIVE 2 4.98 56
David Williamson LIVE 4.98 109
Drew Backenstoss LIVE ACT 4.98 83
Jay Scott Berry LIVE 4.97 37
David Hira LIVE 4.97 67
Toibox Card To Box System by Jonathan Kamm 4.97 133
Jason England LIVE 4.97 33
Dyno by Joe Rindfleisch 4.96 27
Paul Gordon LIVE 4.96 27
Roberto Giobbi LIVE 4.96 25
SvenPad® Minis Black Cover Pair 4.96 24
Mark Mason LIVE 4.96 23
Marc Paul LIVE ACT 4.96 23
Joshua Jay LIVE 4.96 23
Brent Braun LIVE 4.95 22
Seth Kramer LIVE ACT 4.95 21
Robert Temple LIVE 4.95 20
Bandwidth by Greg Wilson 4.95 37
Stegosaurus by Phill Smith 4.94 49
TRIUMPH Starring Oz Pearlman 4.94 31
Banachek LIVE 4.93 59
Fiber Optics Extended by Richard Sanders 4.93 29
Name and Place by Bob Cassidy 4.93 71
The Special Assortment Deck 4.93 28
Cody Fisher LIVE ACT 4.92 26
Blank Face Bicycle Deck 4.92 26
Richard Osterlind LIVE 2: Pocket Mentalism 4.92 38
Scratch by Chad Long 4.92 24
Caught Red-Handed by Michael Mode & Arthur Ottney 4.92 24
Modern Coin Magic by J.B. Bobo 4.91 46
Dave Loosley LIVE 4.91 23
Mark James LIVE 4.91 22
Strong Magic by Darwin Ortiz 4.91 22
Acrobatic Knot (with DVD) by Daryl 4.91 22
DMC ELITES : ROUGE marked deck 4.91 22
Shin Lim LIVE: Visual Magic. 4.90 21
Tornado REFILL 4.90 31
CLEAR CHOICE by Thinking Paradox 4.90 81
Choose Five for 99 4.90 79
True Triumph by Paul Cummins 4.90 29
Eugene Burger LIVE 4.89 57
Predixion by Max Maven 4.89 178
Bill Malone LIVE 4.89 36
25 Least Liked Items
Following table shows the 25 items that have the worst ratings and at least 10 reviews.
Item Rating Review Count
Phantom by Peter Eggink 1.44 16
RETRIEVE (Gimmick and Online Instructions) by Smagic Productions 1.56 16
Penciltration by Jesse Feinberg 1.70 10
Force of Will by Dave Hooper - DVD 1.71 17
Phone Phreak by Jeff Prace & Paul Harris 1.81 16
PK Coin by Nathan Kranzo 2.11 28
POST_NOTE By Antonio Smith-Plata 2.24 17
Never There by Morgan Strebler - DVD 2.29 14
Spirit by Arnel Renegado 2.33 12
The Gecko by Jim Rosenbaum 2.39 36
The Incredible Shrinking Finger by Dan Hauss (Additional handling by Paul Harris) 2.40 10
The Wizards Flip Book 2.41 17
Phone-omenon by Doug McKenzie 2.44 16
Elevator by Peter Loughran 2.47 15
BLAZE by Thinking Paradox 2.53 19
Ambitious Finger by Mario Lopez 2.53 53
Absolute Zero (Gimmick and Online Instructions) by SansMinds 2.53 15
Cheese Smile by Smagic Productions 2.55 11
Liquid Metal 2 by Morgan Strebler 2.57 14
Sealed by Menny Lindenfeld 2.57 61
GREEN FACES by Dalton Wayne 2.58 12
Ice Cold: Propless Mentalism (2 DVD Set) Limited Edition by Morgan Strebler and SansMinds - DVD 2.58 12
Nathan Kranzo LIVE 3 2.60 10
Jay Sankeys ORIGINAL Wrap It Up! (Trick Only) 2.62 21
Sharp This by Vanishing Inc 2.64 11
30 Most Controversial Items
I tried to measure controversiality with a ranking system. If all the reviewers gave the same rating for an item, then the controversiality is calculated as 0%. And the most divided option, where half of the reviewers rate an item 1* while the other half reviews it 5*, is rated as 100% controversiality. Here are the most controversial items with at least 10 reviews:

Item Rating Review Count Controversiality %
HACAAN 3.07 27 92.46
Chris Mayhew LIVE 2.94 16 90.63
Sharp This by Vanishing Inc 2.64 11 89.26
Justin Miller LIVE 3.05 22 88.64
CARD IN THE KEYCHAIN by Stefano Curci 3.20 10 88.00
Cut 2.0 LIMITED by Ran Pink 2.88 16 86.72
P'INK by Ran Pink 2.88 82 84.62
Ice Cold: Propless Mentalism (2 DVD Set) Limited Edition by Morgan Strebler and SansMinds - DVD 2.58 12 84.03
Winner's Dice (Gimmicks and Online Instructions) by Secret Factory 3.38 13 84.02
Stained Glass by Adam Grace 3.10 10 84.00
Joe Monti LIVE 3.36 14 82.14
Elevator by Peter Loughran 2.47 15 81.33
Strongman by Jimmy Strange 2.88 16 81.25
GREEN FACES by Dalton Wayne 2.58 12 80.56
iMove by Oliver Smith 2.67 12 80.56
Jay Sankey's GEMINI POUCH (Trick Only) 3.45 11 80.17
Nathan Kranzo LIVE 3 2.60 10 80.00
Titan's Finger by Titanas 3.63 16 79.69
vACAANt by Area52 3.42 24 78.13
Triple C (Red Gimmicks and Online Instructions) by Christian Engblom 3.70 10 78.00
The Switch by Shin Lim 3.67 18 77.78
Memoria by Luke Jermay (Instant Download) 3.64 11 77.69
Rudy Hunter's Total Control with Cards 3.77 13 77.51
Phone-omenon by Doug McKenzie 2.44 16 77.34
SansMinds Sharpie (DVD and Gimmick) by Will Tsai 3.00 13 76.92
Derren Brown LIVE 2.74 105 76.87
Hidden Hand by Sean Fields 2.84 51 76.62
Harlan's No Tape, No Glue, No Scissors, 20-second Setup Torn & Restored Newspaper 2.76 17 75.78
Darryl Vanamburg's "Black Widow" 3.77 13 75.74
Absolute Zero (Gimmick and Online Instructions) by SansMinds 2.53 15 75.56
submitted by VolkanOzcan to Magic [link] [comments]

How NOT to tell which is "the real Bitcoin"

1) Temporary price and hashpower dominance
Years ago I mused what would happen when the masses indoctrinated in Keynesian economics finally piled into Bitcoin. To hear it from the man himself in one of his rare moments of honesty,
By [inflating the money supply], the government may secretly and unobserved confiscate the wealth of the people, and not one man in a million will detect the theft.
-John Maynard Keynes
Not one man in a million. An exaggeration for effect, but the reality is probably 1% or less really understand the importance of an inflation-free, unmanipulable money supply.
Therefore, I pondered, with the propaganda arms of the world's governments working overtime to reinforce the Keynesian message that inflation is needed to keep the economy running smoothly and avoid the "ravages" of deflation, how hard would it be to get a majority of investors in Bitcoin to be for lifting the 21 million coin limit?
Pffft. Is that even a question? 90% could easily be convinced, probably 99% if the world's governments really tried. Remember this doesn't have to be done by convincing currrent investors to change their stance; much easier to bring in more new investors than have been in Bitcoin up to now, eclipsing them.
The consequences are then obvious: the majority, ney the vast majority, of the investment and therefore hashpower could end up in an Keynesian version of Bitcoin after a chain split. In fact at some point this seemed inevitable.
Is this a bad thing? No, I reasoned, because it will soon enough lose to the better money. It could take a few years, but we will always have our sound money in the original Bitcoin despite being relegated to underdog status and probably even losing the Bitcoin name for a time.
In fact, far from being a disaster, it would be a boon to those of us with the understanding and patience to wait it out: we'd get the chance to double, triple, or even tenfold our money in chain-split arbitrage trading on the backs of the clueless Keynes-indoctrinated masses.
To really drive the point home, consider that even the current crop of crypto investors are a relatively savvy bunch, yet they are granting 6 of the top 10 slots by market cap to coins that have yet to take the plunge to a decentralized model (XRP, EOS, ADA, XLM, IOTA, and NEO).
Realize that these new holders are still the top 1% in terms of general investor savvy, and you have an idea of the extent of the folly in choosing "the real Bitcoin" by market cap (and therefore by hashpower, since hashpower closely follows price).
Far be it from a sign of not being the real McCoy, temporary loss of price dominance is in fact something we should expect to happen perhaps even multiple times in the march to full global adoption.
Two investment adages reinforce the point that the market takes time to determine value and can be deranged in the "short term," which can actually be quite a while:
"The market can stay irrational for longer than you can remain solvent."
"In the short term the market is a popularity contest; in the long term it is a weighing machine."
Finally consider that the whole point of investing is to identify mass delusions and profit from them. An investment that is irrationally hated, as Bitcoin was in 2011 and 2012 - BCH in 2017 and 2018 - represents the ultimate buying opportunity. Bitcoin grew 100x in 2013, meaning about 99% of the investors were new and previously had ignored or disdained Bitcoin.
The nature of an exponentially growing asset is what they used to call on Usenet an "eternal September," wave after way of ever more clueless newbs, ever more ignorant of the history of Bitcoin and ever less educated in economics.
As crypto is currently the biggest investment fad in the world, the weighing machine assessing any "real Bitcoinness" has a big OUT OF ORDER sign on it. Any numbers displayed should be eyed with suspicion.
2) Naming conventions, ticker symbols, etc.
As mentioned above and as should really be obvious in a decentralized system, the one retaining the name Bitcoin for any short-term period can and likely several times in Bitcoin's future will come down to temporary price and popular caprice.
3) Github repo history, domain names, subreddit names, twitter handles, etc.
Should be self-explanatory. These come down to accidents of history, who is willing to pay the most for namespace, and the tribal politics of small groups. If any of these were to be seriously relied upon to determine a chain's worthiness to be the global ledger of civilization, Bitcoin could easily be subverted by bribing or otherwise compromising a website owner, domain squatter, or Github repository maintainer and/or a few committers.
4) Replay protection and emergency difficulty adjustment algorithms
As these are going to necessary for any temporary minority hashpower branch of a chain split, pointing to replay protection or EDA/DAA merely repeats the error of (1) above, the notion that short-term majority hashpower is any kind of reliable measure.
submitted by ForkiusMaximus to btc [link] [comments]

BIP65 Deployment Status at ~26%, Remind your Mining Pool to Upgrade

Pools with "YES" are now producing v4 blocks while pools with "NO" are not, pools with "PARTIAL" have produced v3 blocks after v4 blocks indicating they have only upgraded some of their nodes. Services that run a full node for transaction processing and users also need to upgrade otherwise they should wait for at least 6 confirmations.
Note: Any users running Bitcoin Core should upgrade to 0.11.2 the network, the network needs a lot more nodes running BIP65 compatible code. We should try and get a few thousand nodes upgraded before BIP65 takes effect.
Warning: Because XT has not yet merged BIP65 support, it may extend an invalid chain once 75% is reached, although it is unlikely an invalid chain will be produced at that point because CLTV is non-standard
Pools:
AntPool NO
F2Pool YES
BitFury PARTIAL
BTCC Pool YES
Slush YES
BW.COM YES
KnCMiner NO
21 Inc. NO
GHash.IO PARTIAL
Telco 214 YES
Eligius NO
BitClub Network YES
BitMinter NO
Bitcoin Affiliate Network YES
Solo CKPool YES
Kano CKPool YES
EclipseMC NO
submitted by Lightsword to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Agreement with Satoshi – On the Formalization of Nakamoto Consensus

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/400
Date: 2018-05-01
Author(s): Nicholas Stifter, Aljosha Judmayer, Philipp Schindler, Alexei Zamyatin, Edgar Weippl

Link to Paper


Abstract
The term Nakamoto consensus is generally used to refer to Bitcoin's novel consensus mechanism, by which agreement on its underlying transaction ledger is reached. It is argued that this agreement protocol represents the core innovation behind Bitcoin, because it promises to facilitate the decentralization of trusted third parties. Specifically, Nakamoto consensus seeks to enable mutually distrusting entities with weak pseudonymous identities to reach eventual agreement while the set of participants may change over time. When the Bitcoin white paper was published in late 2008, it lacked a formal analysis of the protocol and the guarantees it claimed to provide. It would take the scientific community several years before first steps towards such a formalization of the Bitcoin protocol and Nakamoto consensus were presented. However, since then the number of works addressing this topic has grown substantially, providing many new and valuable insights. Herein, we present a coherent picture of advancements towards the formalization of Nakamoto consensus, as well as a contextualization in respect to previous research on the agreement problem and fault tolerant distributed computing. Thereby, we outline how Bitcoin's consensus mechanism sets itself apart from previous approaches and where it can provide new impulses and directions to the scientific community. Understanding the core properties and characteristics of Nakamoto consensus is of key importance, not only for assessing the security and reliability of various blockchain systems that are based on the fundamentals of this scheme, but also for designing future systems that aim to fulfill comparable goals.

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TxProbe: Discovering Bitcoin's Network Topology Using Orphan Transactions

arXiv:1812.00942
Date: 2018-12-10
Author(s): Sergi Delgado-Segura, Surya Bakshi, Cristina Pérez-Solà, James Litton, Andrew Pachulski, Andrew Miller, Bobby Bhattacharjee

Link to Paper


Abstract
Bitcoin relies on a peer-to-peer overlay network to broadcast transactions and blocks. From the viewpoint of network measurement, we would like to observe this topology so we can characterize its performance, fairness and robustness. However, this is difficult because Bitcoin is deliberately designed to hide its topology from onlookers. Knowledge of the topology is not in itself a vulnerability, although it could conceivably help an attacker performing targeted eclipse attacks or to deanonymize transaction senders. In this paper we present TxProbe, a novel technique for reconstructing the Bitcoin network topology. TxProbe makes use of peculiarities in how Bitcoin processes out of order, or "orphaned" transactions. We conducted experiments on Bitcoin testnet that suggest our technique reconstructs topology with precision and recall surpassing 90%. We also used TxProbe to take a snapshot of the Bitcoin testnet in just a few hours. TxProbe may be useful for future measurement campaigns of Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency networks.

References
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Hijacking Bitcoin: Routing Attacks on Cryptocurrencies

arXiv:1605.07524
Date: 2017-03-24
Author(s): Maria Apostolaki, Aviv Zohar, Laurent Vanbever

Link to Paper


Abstract
As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to isolate ~50% of the mining power---even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately.

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Echoes of the Past: Recovering Blockchain Metrics From Merged Mining

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1134
Date: 2018-11-22
Author(s): Nicholas Stifter, Philipp Schindler, Aljosha Judmayer, Alexei Zamyatin, Andreas Kern, Edgar Weippl

Link to Paper


Abstract
So far, the topic of merged mining has mainly been considered in a security context, covering issues such as mining power centralization or crosschain attack scenarios. In this work we show that key information for determining blockchain metrics such as the fork rate can be recovered through data extracted from merge mined cryptocurrencies. Specifically, we reconstruct a long-ranging view of forks and stale blocks in Bitcoin from its merge mined child chains, and compare our results to previous findings that were derived from live measurements. Thereby, we show that live monitoring alone is not sufficient to capture a large majority of these events, as we are able to identify a non-negligible portion of stale blocks that were previously unaccounted for. Their authenticity is ensured by cryptographic evidence regarding both, their position in the respective blockchain, as well as the Proof-of-Work difficulty.
Furthermore, by applying this new technique to Litecoin and its child cryptocur rencies, we are able to provide the first extensive view and lower bound on the stale block and fork rate in the Litecoin network. Finally, we outline that a recovery of other important metrics and blockchain characteristics through merged mining may also be possible.

References
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submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

An Analysis of Attacks on Blockchain Consensus

arXiv:1610.07985
Date: 2016-11-20
Author(s): George Bissias, Brian Neil Levine, A. Pinar Ozisik, Gavin Andresen

Link to Paper


Abstract
We present and validate a novel mathematical model of the blockchain mining process and use it to conduct an economic evaluation of the double-spend attack, which is fundamental to all blockchain systems. Our analysis focuses on the value of transactions that can be secured under a conventional double-spend attack, both with and without a concurrent eclipse attack. Our model quantifies the importance of several factors that determine the attack's success, including confirmation depth, attacker mining power, and any confirmation deadline set by the merchant. In general, the security of a transaction against a double-spend attack increases roughly logarithmically with the depth of the block, made easier by the increasing sum of coin turned-over (between individuals) in the blocks, but more difficult by the increasing proof of work required. In recent blockchain data, we observed a median block turnover value of 6 BTC. Based on this value, a merchant requiring a single confirmation is protected against only attackers that can increase the current mining power by 1% or less. However, similar analysis shows that a merchant that requires a much longer 72 confirmations (~12 hours) will eliminate all potential profit for any double-spend attacker adding mining power less than 40% of the current mining power.

References
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submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

As Bitcoin Gold Jumps 50%+ in one day, time to ask... what is Coinbase doing with all those fork funds they've not supported?

Today Bitcoin Gold (BTG) has a MC of $2,630,984,532, each are worth $156.47. In the past 24hrs the price has outperformed most jumping almost 50%+.
BTG hard forked from Bitcoin on 24 October 2017, and has survived for months now.
Here was the Coinbase official stance on the matter from last year:
https://support.coinbase.com/customeportal/articles/2892196-bitcoin-gold-faq
You can see a list of all the major exchanges and wallets that have now implemented support for BTG here which include Bitfinex, Binance, Shapeshift, Ledger, Trezor etc
https://bitcoingold.org
GDAX Coinbase's exchange is still tagged as "future".
Todays spike is a strange one as there has been a fair amount of community cynicism over BTG in the past.
Some of the controversies outlined on its wiki included post-mining, bonus taking, secret mining code and wallet hacks.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin_Gold
That said when you think about the amount of money being retained by large exchanges such as coinbase from all the forks such as BTG, it ptobably eclipses anything BTG has done value wise. In fact BTG has probably posted more updates than Coinbase on the BTG funds they're holding.
The obvious reminder is always retain your private keys yourself, keep them in a hard wallet away from the exchanges or you'll always run the risk of not being able to benifit frim the growing number of hard forks.
That said, I think many newcomers, particularly using gateway exchanges to buy gateway crypto's have just got to grips with concept of Crypto and buying it.
I can understand how then buying hardware wallets and transferring crypto to them could be a daunting task.
I think for those people, maybe lured in to crypto with the likes of Coinbase referral programs really deserve to get at least regular updates from exchanges that are not supporting forks... how, where, why and when.
Also this doesn't include Airdrops where new ICO cryptos are distributed relative to someones holdings of another Crypto such as Bitcoin or Ethereum... again Exchange hodlers are missing out.
Companies and stock brokers need to keep investors updated when issuing dividends to shareholders,
That helps investors to make the educated decision whither or not to keep their money in invested in that company or not for the longterm.
Exchanges should be doing the same for forked funds.
I think with ever new fork that emerges Coinbase are setting themselves up for future legal challenge of somesort, forcing them to go back and support/ distribute all the forked funds they are holding.
This was evident in the case of Bitcoin Cash as it was only rumors of legal action against them that really seemed to get them to up their game.
This is a the risky cloud that will hang over them, particularly when going out for more rounds of funding their growth, as it's a big question mark future risk investors.
They need to be proactive addressing forked funds, instead of just bottling up a future storm by ignoring them.
All in all forks aren't really Coinbase's fault, but their lack of updates are. They have warned people just to take their crypto off the exchange in the past, but when at the same time as they are priding themselves on and encouraging the sign ups of newcomers that maybe aren't as technically minded I don't think this is enough?
submitted by jam-hay to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Merged Mining: Analysis of Effects and Implications

Date: 2017-08-24
Author(s): Alexei Zamyatin, Edgar Weippl

Link to Paper


Abstract
Merged mining refers to the concept of mining more than one cryptocurrency without necessitating additional proof-of-work effort. Merged mining was introduced in 2011 as a boostrapping mechanism for new cryptocurrencies and countermeasures against the fragmentation of mining power across competing systems. Although merged mining has already been adopted by a number of cryptocurrencies, to this date little is known about the effects and implications.
In this thesis, we shed light on this topic area by performing a comprehensive analysis of merged mining in practice. As part of this analysis, we present a block attribution scheme for mining pools to assist in the evaluation of mining centralization. Our findings disclose that mining pools in merge-mined cryptocurrencies have operated at the edge of, and even beyond, the security guarantees offered by the underlying Nakamoto consensus for extended periods. We discuss the implications and security considerations for these cryptocurrencies and the mining ecosystem as a whole, and link our findings to the intended effects of merged mining.

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submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable Blockchain Protocol

arXiv:1510.02037
Date: 2015-11-11
Author(s): Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Emin Gun Sirer, Robbert van Renesse

Link to Paper


Abstract
Cryptocurrencies, based on and led by Bitcoin, have shown promise as infrastructure for pseudonymous online payments, cheap remittance, trustless digital asset exchange, and smart contracts. However, Bitcoin-derived blockchain protocols have inherent scalability limits that trade-off between throughput and latency and withhold the realization of this potential.This paper presents Bitcoin-NG, a new blockchain protocol designed to scale. Based on Bitcoin's blockchain protocol, Bitcoin-NG is Byzantine fault tolerant, is robust to extreme churn, and shares the same trust model obviating qualitative changes to the ecosystem.In addition to Bitcoin-NG, we introduce several novel metrics of interest in quantifying the security and efficiency of Bitcoin-like blockchain protocols. We implement Bitcoin-NG and perform large-scale experiments at 15% the size of the operational Bitcoin system, using unchanged clients of both protocols. These experiments demonstrate that Bitcoin-NG scales optimally, with bandwidth limited only by the capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited only by the propagation time of the network.

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submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

A Formal Treatment of Hardware Wallets

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/034
Date: 2019-01-14
Author(s): Myrto Arapinis, Andriana Gkaniatsou, Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias

Link to Paper


Abstract
Bitcoin, being the most successful cryptocurrency, has been repeatedly attacked with many users losing their funds. The industry's response to securing the user's assets is to offer tamper-resistant hardware wallets. Although such wallets are considered to be the most secure means for managing an account, no formal attempt has been previously done to identify, model and formally verify their properties. This paper provides the first formal model of the Bitcoin hardware wallet operations. We identify the properties and security parameters of a Bitcoin wallet and formally define them in the Universal Composition (UC) Framework. We present a modular treatment of a hardware wallet ecosystem, by realizing the wallet functionality in a hybrid setting defined by a set of protocols. This approach allows us to capture in detail the wallet's components, their interaction and the potential threats. We deduce the wallet's security by proving that it is secure under common cryptographic assumptions, provided that there is no deviation in the protocol execution. Finally, we define the attacks that are successful under a protocol deviation, and analyze the security of commercially available wallets.

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submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Add-on In Minecraft! Solar Eclipse, Mercury RETRO, Bitcoin Cash, War - what's it all mean? MC PH - Bitcoins (GR6 Filmes) Djay W - YouTube DOES THIS LONG-TERM BITCOIN PATTERN PREDICT A $6,483 CRASH ... Bitcoin Mining Max Profits - Gmod DarkRP (Bitcoin Miner ...

Title: Bitcoin Mining Pool - Eclipse Mining Consortium Description: A shared mining pool with shares valued according to the Double Geometric Method or Pay Per Share. Also offers merged Namecoin mining. Keywords: eclipse. Last update was 666 days ago UPDATE NOW. This can take up to 60 seconds. Please wait... Eclipse Mining Consortium is a mining pool with server locations in the US and EU. It is run by Josh Zerlan. This pool pays out using a double geometric share reward system. It also offers simultaneous merged mining of BTC and NMC].. The service was first available on June 13, 2011.. The coinbase signature for this pool is: "EMC". Eclipse MC is a Bitcoin mining consortium that allows users to unite their processing power to mine Bitcoins at a greater rate than they would individually. The available calls can be retrieved through the API, but include queries to get the pools statistical information, user information, and block information. The API uses REST calls, and returns JSON. May 2018 Update – Unfortunately Eclipse MC stopped running some time ago, this article remains online as a reference. A look at Eclipse Mining Consortium’s Mining Pool. Please note: This review is based on a relatively small amount of hashing, a few hundred ghs. The stats outlined in this review may not apply to larger miners. eclipse mc Archive. Eclipse Mining Consortium (Eclipse MC) Mining Pool Review. ... If you want to buy a secure, hardware based wallet that supports Bitcoin, Ethereum (via MyEtherWallet) and other major cryptocurrencies including Dash, Litecoin and zCash, ...

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Bitcoin Add-on In Minecraft!

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